Abstract: What is the purpose of prayer?AccordingtoKierkegaard, "prayer does not changeGod, but it changes the one who prays." Whilst much contemporary philosophyofr eligion focuses on the so-called puzzle of petitionary prayer,less is written about how prayer can changet he person who prays. In this paper,I discuss Kierkegaard'saccount of prayer in TheSickness unto Death and "An Occasional Discourse on the Occasion of Confession." Prayer,a si ti sp resented here, allows ap erson to gain ac ertain kind of self-knowledge and thereby draw near to God. Aftero utlining Kierkegaard'sa ccount,Idraw some comparisons with Harry Frankfurt'saccount of the will to demonstrate how prayer might allow for both self-knowledge as wella sG od-knowledge.
the puzzle without denying their assumption.Moreover,evenifpetitioning God can make a differenceinus, we cannot petition him while thinkingthat our words won'tmakeany difference to whetherh ed oes what we ask.³ The Howard-Snyders acknowledge that the kind of thinking behind Kierkegaard'sv iew on prayer is valuable, but irrelevant to the puzzle of petitionary prayer.Yet,i nf ocusing onlyo nt he petitionary aspect of prayer,the philosophy of Christian prayer risks becomings kewed in focus. Even if we disagree with Kierkegaard'sc onclusion (that prayer onlyc hanges us, and not God), the question thats eems pertinent to ask is: How does prayer changet he person who prays?
In this paper,Ia rgue that the purpose of prayer is to gain knowledge of oneself. However,t his is not the kind of knowledge one can gain merelyb yi ntrospecting-the account of prayer Iw ill focus on here aims to draw ap erson closer to God through their knowledge of self. To do this,Ifocus on the short, but intriguing, account of prayer that we find in Kierkegaard's TheS ickness unto Death. Kierkegaard'sp seudonymous author,A nti-Climacus, writes, "to pray is…to breathe, and possibility is for the self what oxygen is for breathing."⁴ Whatd oes Anti-Climacus mean by this remark?I np resentingt his passagei nt he wider context of TheS ickness unto Death,Iarguet hat prayer as it is presented here is best understood as an activity which enables ap erson to gain ak ind of self-knowledge.M ore specifically, in seeing what AntiClimacus writes about the human self as asynthesis of necessity and possibility, we can see prayer as an activity of becomingm ore aware of our existencea s creatures who expressb oth necessity (wea re physical, mortal creatures) and possibility( it is possible for us to somehow transcend this earthlyl ife and the constraints of everydayp hysical existence). Afterd iscussing Kierkegaard's account of prayer and self-knowledge in TheSickness unto Death,Idraw acomparisonb etween Kierkegaard'sH arry Frankfurt'sa ccounts of the will.⁵ Drawing on Frankfurt'snotion of wholeheartedness,Idescribethe Kierkegaardian notion of despair as ak ind of internal conflict of the will which is irresolvable without intervention from God; despair cannotbeovercome, Anti-Climacus tells us, until the soul "rests transparentlyi nG od."⁶ To explain what generates this internal conflict,Iarguet hata ll human beingsh aveaf irst-order desire for union with God which is often supressed, ignored, or misunderstood. It is onlyw hen this desire for God is unified with ah igher-order desire for union with God thata person can be free of despair and come close to God. Thus, it follows, in order for ap erson to come close to God in faith, she must become conscious of her inherent desire for God. That is, prayer makes possible ak ind of Godknowledge via self-knowledge.⁷
II Kierkegaardo nP rayer
Those familiar with Kierkegaard'sw ritingsw ill know thatt hey are littered with short,a nd often profound, examples of prayers.⁸ Kierkegaard alsoo ffers some thoughts on the purpose of prayer,a tp laces in his writings. In his "Occasional Discourse on the Occasion of Confession," for instance, Kierkegaard discusses an example of ac onfessional prayer.K ierkegaardw rites that [a] hasty explanation can suppose that to prayisafutile act because aperson'sprayerdoes not,o fc ourse, change the changeless;b ut in the long run would this be desirable, could not the changingp erson easilyc ome to repentt hat he managedt og et God changed! Thus,t he true explanation is also the one and onlyt ob ed esired: the prayerd oes not change God, but it changest he one whop rays.⁹ AccordingtoKierkegaard, to pray is not to seek to changeGod'smind, or at least not in the context of aconfession, but rather,toprayistoseek to changeoneself. Whilst it appears that Kierkegaard seeks to disregard petitionary prayer altogeth- Some points of clarification: First,t his paper is not an attempt to offer as olution to the problem of petitionary prayer. The claim that prayerp rimarilyc hangesu sa nd not God is not as atisfyingr esponse to the problem of petitionary prayer,yet this does not mean that prayer as am eans of self-knowledgei sw ithout philosophical interest (although this maye xplain the lack of exploration of this kind of prayerb ya nalytic philosophers). Secondly, therei sm uch to be said on Kierkegaard'sd iscussion of self-knowledge (for discussions of Kierkegaarda nd self-knowledge, see John Lippitt's "Self-Knowledge in Kierkegaard," in Self-Knowledge,e d. by Ursula Renz, Oxford: OxfordU niversity Press 2016;o rD aniel Watts's "Kierkegaarda nd the Search for Self-Knowledge," European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, 2013,p p. 525 -549) . There is not scopef or ab road overview of what Kierkegaardw rites on self-knowledgeh ere. My focus will primarilyb et og ivea na ccount of prayerw hich drawso na spectso fK ierkegaard's thinking, rather than to offer as ystematico verview of Kierkegaard'st houghts on the topics of either self-knowledge or prayer.  These are compiled in ThePrayers of Kierkegaard, ed. by Perry D. Le Fevre, Chicago:The University of Chicago Press 1956.  SKS 8, 137 / UD,2 2.
Prayer as God-knowledge( viaS elf) er here, we need not reach such ad rastic conclusion to follow Kierkegaard's thoughts on prayer.A st he Howard-Snyders acknowledge,i ti se ntirely possiblef or prayer to changeb otht he individual and God. The question that I am interestedi ne xploring here concerns what differencep rayerm akes to the pray-er.
What is the nature of this change? In the context of the discourse, we find this discussion of confessional prayer alongside Kierkegaard'sd iscussion of the human will. Kierkegaard describes faith as ak ind of single-mindedness in which an individual has the purity of heart to will onlyt he good. And it is this purity of heart and single-mindedness of the will which allows ap erson to draw near to God. Kierkegaard writes that "onlyt he pure in heart are able to see God and consequentlyk eep near to him."¹⁰ When Kierkegaards peaks of "nearness" to God or "distance" from God, we should read this in terms of willed distance from God. Although God never distances himself from us, the resulto fd espair and sin is aw illed distance from God-human beingsc hoose to be far from God by lacking ap urity of heart to will the good.
Conversely, it is aperson'slack of ability to will onlythe good, or their being in astate of sin, which means that they will not to come near to God. Sin, as it is discussed here, is akind of despair in which aperson has two wills;¹¹ although a person wills the good and wills to be close to God, she is double-minded or conflicted in her will. Fori nstance, she might pursue the good for some selfish purpose such as for some reward,¹² or fear of punishment.¹³ Or,K ierkegaard tells us, ap erson can be double-minded by onlyp artiallyw illing the good through busyness or distraction.¹⁴ Hence, the prayer of confession seeks to changeaperson by ac hangeo ft he will. Prayer then seeks to bring about a changef rom double-mindedness to single-mindedness in ap erson.
This discussion of prayer as ar esponse to double-mindedness is picked up two years later by Kierkegaard in the pseudonymouslysigned TheS ickness unto Death. Here, the author,A nti-Climacus, develops as imilar account of faith, sin, and despair,albeit in more philosophical terms.AccordingtoAnti-Climacus, the universal human condition is that of despair.Despair,asitisdefined in Sickness, is aw ilful misrelation to oneself. Either through ignorance, weakness, or defiance, ap erson can be in as tate of despair by failing to willt ob eaself in the appropriate way. Anti-Climacus defines the self as a "synthesiso ft he infinite and the finite, of the temporaland the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, asynthesis."¹⁵ As Murray Rae describes it,this is an attempt to maintain the tension which is found in the biblical view of the self; human beingsare but dust (Gen 3:19), yet, they "have been made al ittle lower thanG od" (Ps 8:5).¹⁶ Despair is afailureofthe willinrelation to the self. As it is described later in Sickness,i ti st he basis of human sin. The kind of despair Anti-Climacus has in mind is summarised well by the words of the Anglican confession: "Father…we have sinned against you… through ignorance, through weakness,t hrough our own deliberate fault."¹⁷ Ap erson can express despair because of their lack of self-awareness,t hrough ak ind of weakness of will or through ak ind of defiance. Hence, despair is closelyr elated to ap erson'ss elf-knowledge.A ntiClimacus writes that "[t]he more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self. Ap erson who has no will is not as elf; but the more will he has, the more self-consciousness he has also."¹⁸ Thus, despair is ak ind of internal conflicto faperson'sw ill in which she cannot or refuses to will to be as elf.
The discussion of the will in Sickness is related to thati nt he "Occasional Discourse." HereK ierkegaard describes the sin of double-mindedness as a kind of despair ("what else is it to despair but to have two wills!"¹⁹)D espair as aw ilful misrelation to oneself (e. g., to despair through al ack of possibility) can be understood in terms of double-mindedness too. As Anti-Climacus repeatedlye mphasises, what the person in despair lacks is the condition of faith in which ap erson is free from despair and can relate properlyt oG od. AntiClimacus explicitlycalls the condition "the good"²⁰ in places.Ifdespair is afragmentationo ft he will in which therei sc onflict,f aith is the antidote to this conflict; faith is characterized by restingi nG od and willing onlyt he good.
One of the keyw aysap erson can exist in despair is by failing to exist as a synthesisinthe mannerwhich Anti-Climacus is vital for existing as aself. Since aperson is asynthesisofnecessity and possibility,aperson can fall into despair because they lack either necessity or possibility in how they live.F or instance, the despair of possibilityi sc haracterised by someone who livesafantastical life full of imagination, hopes and dreams but who never sees these dreams ac- SKS 11, 129 / SUD,13.  MurrayR ae, Kierkegaarda nd Theology, Edinburgh:T&T Clark 2010,p .9 2.  Church of England, "AF orm of Preparation," in Common Worship, from: https://www. churchofengland.org/prayer-worship/worship/texts.aspx[ last accessed July 2016].  SKS 11, 145/SUD,2 9.  SKS 8, 144/UD,3 0.  SKS 11, 213/SUD,101.
Prayer as God-knowledge( viaS elf) tualized. "What is missing" from such alife, Anti-Climacus tells us "is essentially the power to obey,tosubmit to one'slimitations."²¹ Although it is vital that a person expresses possibilityi nh ow they live,w ithout expressing necessity,a person is not fullyaself, and thus exists in despair,a ccordingt oA ntiClimacus. He writes that "[p]ossibility is like ac hild'si nvitation to ap arty;t he child is willing at once, but the question now is whether the parents will give permission-and as it is with the parents, so it is with necessity."²² Conversely, just as ap erson falls into despair through possibility alone,aperson who exists onlyt hrough necessitya lso exists in despair.S uch ac ondition, AntiClimacus comparest oakind of "fatalism."²³ To despair by lacking possibility is to submit oneself to the facts of one'ss ituation-although one cannot exist by expressingo nlyt he possible, to exist without anyp ossibility is resign oneself to the inevitablya nd uncontrollability of the future. Crucially, what the fatalist lacks is the possibilityo ff aith. From the perspective of the fatalist, salvation is impossible and human beingsa re condemned to despair.A ntiClimacus states that " [t] he believer has the ever infallible antidote for despair -possibility-because for God everything is possible at every moment.T hisi s the good health of faith."²⁴ Faith is presented as the antidote to the condition of despair-if there is God for whom all thingsa re possible, fatalism is false.
It is against this backdrop that we find Anti-Climacus account of prayer.H e tells us that [t] he fatalist is in despair,h as lost God and thus his self, for he who does not have aG od does not have aself, either.But the fatalist has no God, or,whatamounts to the same thing, his God is necessity;since everythingispossible for God, then God is this-that everything is possible. Thereforethe fatalist'sworship of God is at most an interjection, and essentially it is am uteness,am utec apitulation: he is unable to pray. To prayi sa lso to breathe, and possibilityi sf or the self what oxygen is for breathing. Nevertheless, possibilitya lone or necessity alone can no moreb et he condition for breathingo fp rayert han oxygen alone or nitrogena lone can be that for breathing. Fort op rayt herem ust be aG od, as elf-and possibility-or as elf and possibilityi napregnant sense, because the beingo fG od means that everythingi sp ossible, or that everythingi sp ossible means the beingo f God…That God'sw ill is the possible makes me able to pray, if therei sn othingb ut necessity,m an is essentiallya si narticulatea st he animals.²⁵  SKS 11, 152 / SUD,3 6.  SKS 11, 152 / SUD,3 7.  SKS 11, 155 / SUD,40.  SKS 11, 155 / SUD,3 9-40.  SKS 11, 155 -156 / SUD,40-41.
The fatalist is in despair since he lacks possibility.The analogythat is used here is of breathing-possibility provides oxygen for an individual, yetaperson cannot exist by onlyb reathingo xygen. The fatalist lacks the ability to pray because to pray is to relatet oaGod for whom all thingsa re possible, not least is the possibility of one'so wn salvation. Prayer,a si ti sp resented here requires ab asic level of self-awareness-remember,d espair is ac ondition of a person'sw ill and the fatalist,t hrough ignorance, defiance,o rw eakness is unable to pray since he is unable to express possibility.
Not onlydoes prayer require alevel of self-knowledge but alsoitbringswith it ak ind of self-knowledge.The human self, in Anti-Climacus'sp resentation, is not staticbut something which requires aperpetual act of the will. Thus, to exist as asynthesis of necessityand possibility requires akind of breathing-aperson must be constantlyb reathingi np ossibilityi nA nti-Climacus'sm etaphor.²⁶ The implication of this analogyi st hat prayer allows ap erson to become more self-aware. Prayer is ap erpetual reminder that for God all thingsa re possible. Furthermore, since the human self is as ynthesiso fn ecessity and possibility, by relatingt oG od as the sourceo fp ossibility, one comes to be aware that she does not exist as ap urelyn ecessary being.
As with the discussion of prayer in the occasional discourse, Anti-Climacus describes prayer as something which bringsabout changeinthe individual; this is achangeinaperson'sself-awareness.Prayerbringshome this fact that Iama synthesiso ft he necessary and the possible-Ie xist as am ortal, physical thing who is condemned to despair,y et Ib reathe in the possibility of faith, that for God all thingsa re possible. Or,t op ut it more simply,p rayera llows ap erson to gain knowledge of themselves. We also find this claim about self-knowledge and prayer in "Occasional Discourse." Kierkegaard writes:
The person confessingi sn ot likes omeone confiding in af riend, whomh ei nitiates, in advance or afterward,i ntos omethingh ed id not know before; the Omniscient One does not find out anythinga bout the person confessing, but instead the person confessing finds out somethingabout himself. Therefore, do not raise the objection against the confession that there is no benefit in confiding to an omniscient one what he alreadyknows;first answer the question whether it does not benefit ap erson to find out somethinga bout himself that he did not know!²⁷
We can see more clearly that the changeb rought about through prayer (from double-mindedness to single-mindedness) is ac hangeo fk nowledge.Aperson comes to know something through the act of praying.A ccordingtoKierkegaard, the practice of prayer drawsaperson before God to reflect on their sin; if the fatalist werem ore self-conscious,h ew ould realise thath ei sn ot merelya necessary,p hysical being,b ut rather,h er elates to aG od for whom all things are possible. Not onlyt his,b ut alsot he fatalist cannot draw near to God because of his sin. Ther evelation of God through prayer bringsh ome the fact that ap erson is in despair and in despair ap erson cannot relatet oG od in faith. ForK ierkegaard, self-knowledge is an essential part of our comingt o know God. In aj ournal entry,h ep uts it as follows: Prayer as self-knowledge is onlyh alf of the picture,f or Kierkegaard. True selfknowledge must not onlyr elate to the self, but must also relatet oG od. As Anti-Climacus writes, "[t]he human self is such ad erived, established relation that relates itself to itself and in relatingi tself to itself relates itself to another."²⁹ To will onlyt he good, ap erson must come to will to be in union with God. And thus, ap erson can onlys ingle-mindedlyw ill the good when they are able to "rest transparentlyi nG od."³⁰
III Wholeheartedness
Kierkegaard'sm odel of prayer as am eans of comingt ok now God (via self)i s promisinga samodel of prayer.I nt he remainder of this paper,Iwill develop this account of prayer by drawing on Harry Frankfurt'sa nalysis of the will to try and further shed light on how prayer can bring about self-knowledge and  SKS 24,4 25,N B24:159 / JP 4, 3902.  SKS 11, 129 / SUD,13-14.  SKS 11, 146/SUD,30. The idea that knowledge of self is importantfor knowledge of God has some precedencei nt he spiritual/theological literature: "[F]irst flows self-knowledge and from this source arises knowledgeo fG od" (John of the Cross, DarkN ight of the Soul,t rans. by Mirabai Starrm,N ew York: Riverhead Books, 2002,p p. 78 -79.) See also John Calvin: "Nearly all the wisdom which we possess,t hat is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts:t he knowledgeo fG od and of ourselves. But,w hile joined by manyb onds,w hich one precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern." (John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, abridgedv ersion, London/Louisville: Westminster John KnoxP ress,p .1.) whyt his might in turn allow for an increased knowledge of God.S imilarly to Anti-Climacus, Frankfurt states that the human will has an essential role to playi no ur understanding of personhood.³¹ He writes, [i] t is my view the one essential differenceb etween persons and other creaturesi st ob e found in the structureo faperson'sw ill. Human beings aren ot alone in havingd esires and motivations, or in makingc hoices. They sharet hese things with the memberso f certain other species,s ome of whom appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristico fh umans, however,that they are able to form what Is hall call "secondo rder desires."³² ForF rankfurt,towill is to be able to form second-order desires.³³ The difference between first-order and second-order desires,asFrankfurt defines it,isthat firstorder desires are desires "to do or not to do one thing or another,"³⁴ whereas second-order desires are desires which are directed towards first-order desires. As econd-order desire is ad esire to desire something.A ne xample will help to make this clearer.Imayh avet he first-order desire to gorge myself on chocolatee very night and Im ight also have the first order desire not to get too fat.Imight also have certain second-order desires:t he desire not to desire chocolates oo ften, or ad esire to have ag reater desire to not gett oo fat,f or example. Now,t he will, in Frankfurt'st erminologyi ss imply "an effective desire-one that moves( or will or would move)aperson all the wayt o action."³⁵ Willing differs from intending, for instance, in that "even though someone mayh aveasettled intention to do X, he mayn onetheless do something else instead of doing Xb ecause,d espite his intention, his desire to do Xp roves to be weaker or less effective than some conflictingd esire."³⁶ Thus, Im ay fail to will to desire less chocolatei fm ys econd-order desire to desire less chocolatef ails to be effective.T hat is, if Iw ant my desire for selfcontrol to trump my desire for delicious chocolate, and Ie at the delicious  Ia ppreciatet hat "selfhood" in Anti-Climacus'sa ccounta nd "personhood" in Frankfurt's discussionm ight not be equivalent,b ut,a sw ew ill see, therei ss ufficient similarity in what these twoa ccounts are interested in describingt hat the application of Frankfurt'sa ccount of the will is still ah elpful comparison to make.  Frankfurt, TheI mportance of What We Care About, p. 12.  Notethe similarity herewith what Anti-Climacus has to say: "[t]he possibility of this sickness [despair] is man'ss uperiority over the animal" (SKS 11, 131 / SUD,1 5). Or,i no ther words,t he capacity to will, or morep recisely, af ailure to will, distinguishes human beings from other animals.  Frankfurt, TheI mportance of What We Care About, p. 12.  Ibid., p. 14.  Ibid., p. 14.
Prayer as God-knowledge (via Self) chocolate, Ih avef ailed to will effectively.T his kind of second-order desire, in which ap erson wantsadesire to be his will, is what Frankfurt calls a "second order volition."³⁷ Just as we found in Kierkegaard'swritings, Frankfurtargues that the human will can be distorted or in conflict in various ways.O nF rankfurt'sa ccount,a person has ah ierarchyo fd esires;s ome of our desires playamorec rucial role than others, and some of our less important desires are subordinatet om ore importantd esires.M yd esire to be am orallyg ood person, for instance,t rumps my desires for having as much fun as possible. Thus, when my desire for having fun conflicts with my desire for moral goodness,Idesire to have the second-order volition to will the right action, and not the most fun action. Because of the possibility of having hierarchya nd structure in our desires,i t is possiblet ol ack what Frankfurtc alls "wholeheartedness" (Kierkegaard's term "double-mindedness" looks just as appropriate here) wheno ur internal desires conflict in some way.³⁸ In such ac ase, Frankfurt remarks,
[i]t is not am atter of volitional strength but of whether the highest-order preferencesc oncerning some volitional issue are wholehearted. It has to do with the possibility that thereis no unequivocal answer to the question of what the person reallyw ants,e vent hough his desiresdoform acomplex and extensive hierarchical structure. Theremight be no unequivocal answer,because the person is ambivalent with respect to the object he comes closest to reallywanting: In other words, because with respect to that object,heisdrawn not only towardi tb ut away from it too. Or there might be no unequivocal answerb ecause the person'sp referencesc oncerningw hath ew ants aren ot fullyi ntegrated, so that there is some inconsistency or conflict (perhaps not yetm anifest) among them.³⁹ Wholeheartedness is as tructural property of one'swill in which aperson has a freedom of will because their desires are integrated in the appropriate way. That  Ibid., p. 16.  Rudd makes this comparison between single-mindedness and wholeheartedness. He notes that contrary to Frankfurt'ss ubjective understanding of wholeheartedness, for Kierkegaard, "onlyt he Good can be willed wholeheartedly" (AntonyR udd, "Kierkegaard'sP latonism and the Reasons of Love," in Love, Reason and Will: Kierkegaard after Frankfurt, ed. by Antony Rudd and John Davenport,N ew York and London: Bloomsbury 2015,p254).  Frankfurt, TheImportance of What We Care About, p. 165. This kind of conflict of the will can also occurb ecause of ak ind of ignorancet owards one'sd esires, according to Frankfurt: "It is possible for ah uman beingt ob ea tt imes,a nd perhapse vena lways,i ndifferent towards his own motives-to taken oe valuative attitude towardt he desires that incline him to act.I f therei saconflict between those desires, he does not carew hich of them proves to be more effective.I no ther words, the individual does not participatei nt he conflict.T herefore,t he outcome of the conflict can be neither avictory for him nor adefeat." (Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 164.) is, therei sn othing internallya bout ap erson'sd esires or volitions which is preventing them from willing in ac ertain way.
This analysis can easilyb ee xtended to think about the conflict of will we find in Kierkegaard'sa nalysis of double-mindedness and despair.U nderstood in these terms,K ierkegaard'sn otion of despair is ac ondition of lacking wholeheartedness,o fn ot beinga blet ow ill effectively.I np articular,d espair is the condition of failing to will onlyt he good because of the conflicto fo ne'sw ill due to al ack of wholeheartedness or internal fragmentation. However, whereas Frankfurt'sn otion of wholeheartedness is as tructural property of the will, for Kierkegaard, there is something more objective about single-mindedness.⁴⁰ Kierkegaard'sa ccount of single-mindedness,i nc ontrastt oF rankfurt's, depends not onlyo nt he structure of ap erson'sw ill, but alsoo nw hether or not thatp erson wills the good. And unlike Frankfurt,K ierkegaard has ac lear idea of how ap erson'sw illn eedst ob ei ntegrated in order to be wholehearted. As bothKierkegaard and Anti-Climacus describeit, human beingsare unable to be content until they "rest transparentlyi nG od"⁴¹ or "will onlyt he good."⁴² As AnthonyR udd describes, for Kierkegaard, [o] n the…Kierkegaardian view…In eed to appeal to standards outside of me-to the True and the Good-and if If ind Ia ma verse to them, then this is not somethingt ob e accepted, but to be struggleda gainst.I ft herei sagenuinelya uthoritative standard, then choices made with reference to that standarda re not arbitrary.This can It hink, help us to see the force of Kierkegaard'sc laim that it is onlyt hroughb eingo rientated to God that the self is able to hold together the elementso ft ranscendencea nd immanence in creative tension, and that the loss of that orientation necessarilyr esults in the internal conflict,o rs elf-mutilation that Kierkegaardc alls 'despair' or 'sin'.A ta ny rate, we can see whyi ts eem plausible to claim that the self needs an orientation to the Good to prevent it from despairing in this sense.⁴³  Frankfurt'sa ccounto fw holeheartedness is susceptible to the followingk ind of counter examples: "Evei sastrong,i ndependent youngw oman. She longsf or an education and career of her own. Unfortunately, she has been born into as trict,r eligious community.I nt hat community,w omen aree xpected to be meek and compliant,t oa ccept male authority,t o remain uneducated, and maintain as ubservient societal role. Ever ejects those values and insists that she be respectedasfullyequal to anyone else. But after years of failure, condemnation, and psychological and physical abuse, she breaks down. She starts to accept the subservient role. She becomes aw illingc onvert." (BruceN .W aller, Against MoralR esponsibility, Cambridge,M ass.: MIT Press 2011, p. 61.)  SKS 11, 146/SUD,3 0.  SKS 8, 138 / UD,2 4.  Rudd, "Kierkegaard'sP latonism and the Reasons of Love," pp. 258-59.
Prayer as God-knowledge (via Self) In order to make sense of this account in Frankfurtian terms,then,wemustclaim that human beingsh avea ni nherent first-order desire for the good which will always conflict with one'so ther desires until one becomes wholehearted. If one can onlyb ec ontent by resting transparentlyi nG od, then one wayo f making sense of this is that restingt ransparentlyi nG od satisfies ac ertain desire, even if one wasu naware of this desire. It is onlyw hen one is able to have an effective second-order volition to will the good that ap erson'sd esires become structured in such aw ay that there is no conflict.
IV Prayer as God-knowledge( viaS elf)
The implication of the Kierkegaardian/Frankfurtian account of the will Ih ave been consideringi st hat it is onlyb ys ubmitting to the will of God thata person be trulyf ree and wholehearted.T he ultimateg ood for human beings, as we have seen, Anti-Climacus repeatedlye mphasise, is to "rest transparently in God."⁴⁴ If it is true thath uman beingsp ossess an inherent desire for God which must be integrated around ah igher-order desire for goodness, then the more self-aware one becomes,t he more one realisest hatt he onlyw ay of unifying one'sd esires and will is by comingc loser to God.
This account of wholeheartednesscan help us to see how Christian faith and sin are related to the will in more precise terms. The resulto fh uman sin is that human beingslack the resources to come into union with God,since their desires are not aimedatthe good. They fail to will to be aself since they lack the higherorder desire which can fullyintegrate theirwill. ForAnti-Climacus, faith is agift from God which provides the antidote to despair.W ec an understand this in Frankfurtian terms:f aith is the reception of the higher-order desire to will the good, around which all of ap erson'sd esires can be integrated. The life of faith, then, is al ife of reintegration of ap erson'sd esires and will so that, eventually, they mayb ew holehearted in their desire for the good.⁴⁵ The practice of prayer can be seen as ac rucial part of this process of reintegration. Fort he person who has receivedt he gift of faith and the higher-order desire for the good, the purpose of prayer is to become more self-aware, to discover where one'sd esires are not unified around the good, and whereo ne is not singleminded.
 SKS 11, 146/SUD,3 0.  EleonoreS tump also draws on Frankfurt'sa nalysis of higher-order desirest oe xplain her Thomisticview of the ordo salutis;cf. EleonoreStump, Wandering Darkness,Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2010.
How is it possiblefor prayer to bring aperson out of despair and eventually closer to God?J ohn Lippitt, in his discussion of Kierkegaard'sa ccount of selfknowledge,d escribes ap erson'ss elf-knowledge in first person, third person and second personal terms.H ew ritest hat self-knowledge seeks "to understand sin as an objective property in which all humanityisimplicated, but to relateto this on afirst-person, subjective level as something that applies to me. Standing 'before God' (second-person) is what bringst his home."⁴⁶ As Lippittr eads Kierkegaard'sdiscussion of self-knowledge,true self-knowledge requiresustocome close to God and it is in this encounter with God thatap erson comes to realise the extent of their sin and their distance from God. To continue the application of Frankfurt'st erminology-by experiencing God in prayer,aperson comes to realise that they have ad eep-seated desire for union with God and that this conflicts with their other desires.F urthermore, this conflict (or despair)i st he very thing which prevents this person from enjoying ac loseness in relationship to God. Onlythrough apurity of the will can aperson come to know God, but in experiencing God,aperson comes to realise that their will is too fragmented to wholeheartedlyw ill to be in union. It is this realisation thatm yd esire and my will prevent me from the one thing that can bring wholeheartedness, that I can begin the process of reintegration. Thek ey differenceb etween the kind of self-knowledge made possiblei np rayer, and all other kindso fi ntrospection or self-knowledge,t hen, is thatp rayerb egins before God and the content of self-knowledge relates to ap erson'sw illa nd desires.
As Eleonore Stump argues, in order for persons to be close to one another, there has to be am utual self-revelation in which both person'ss hare their thoughts and feelingf reely.⁴⁷ However,i faperson is fragmented because of a lack of wholeheartedness,t hen this precludes the possibility of personal closeness:
Ap erson alienated from himself cannot have someone else close to him. Jerome cannot reveal his mind to Paula if Jerome has hidden ag ood part of his mind from himself. And, if Jeromed esiresn ot to have the desiresh eh as with regardt oP aula, then to that extent he does not desirec loseness with Paula either.F or that matter,i fJ eromei s divided within himself as regards anyo fh is desires, Paula will be distant from some part of Jerome,n om atter which of his conflictingd esires she allies herself with. So, for Paula to be close to Jerome, it is necessary that Jerome be integrated in himself.⁴⁸  John Lippitt, "Self-knowledge in Kierkegaard," p. 16.  Stump, Wanderingi nD arkness,p .120.  Stump, Wanderingi nD arkness, p. 125.
Prayer as God-knowledge( via Self) Stump'saccount of personal closeness can be extended to think about closeness with God. Anti-Climacus writes thatChristianityteaches that aperson is "invited to live on the most intimate terms with God";⁴⁹ we can see despair as ak ind of fragmentation that prevents this kind of intimacy from occurring. In short,those living in astate of despair,ordouble-mindedness, are not able to be close to God because there are parts of themselvesw hich are hidden even to theiro wn consciousness. Thus, when Anti-Climacus describes prayer as ab reathingo f necessity and possibility,wec an see this as ak ind of re-orientation of the self in which ap erson comes to recognise theiro wn fragmentation (either they lean too heavilyt owards necessity or too heavilyt owards possibility).
The crucial feature of this account of prayer,i st hat this realisation occurs when one is before God. Fort he fatalist,c omingb efore God bringsw ith it the realisation that everythingi sp ossiblef or God,a nd thus, it is her own despair which prevents her from drawingn eart oG od as as ynthesiso fn ecessity and possibility. Self-awareness is essentialf or the possibilityo fb eing near to God. As we have seen, the practice of prayer makes possible ak ind of selfknowledge through the experience of being before God. In turn, this selfknowledge allows ap erson to realignt heir will in the appropriate way, and thus, to draw close to God.  SKS 11, 199 / SUD, 8 5. 
